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 ‘Of course we do’: inequality, the family, and the spell of social mobility 
Gideon Calder 
 
A striking feature of the recent rekindling of debates about grammar schools is how 
readily the priority of social mobility is pushed, across the political spectrum. Left and 
right will disagree about whether grammar schools promote it, but the notion itself 
seems scarcely up for dispute. This raises a number of questions. If people from 
different political directions are so united in their keenness to achieve it, why has 
social mobility been stagnating for decades? Why do the life chances of rich and poor 
still differ in such stark respects? Part of the answer, I’ll suggest in this article, lies in 
a widely shared set of  ‘common sense’ beliefs about the family that severely limit the 
political scope for achieving anything like fairness for generations of children born 
into a society with stark class divisions. We talk a lot about social mobility while at 
the same time avoiding some of the uncomfortable places to which we would need to 
travel in any genuine attempt to realise it. 
 
Everyone loves social mobility… 
Theresa May, for one, is a fan of social mobility. Or, as she put it on 31 August 2016, 
she wants a Britain where, when it comes to where you end up in life, ‘it’s the talent 
that you have and how hard you’re prepared to work that determines how you get on, 
rather than your background’.i In a way, this counts as news: it tells us something 
about how the incoming prime minister wants to stake out her defining aims. And it’s 
a reminder of the seemingly compulsory move among incoming Conservative leaders 
to go all ‘classless society’ on us, and to sound more inclusive than they’d previously 
let on. Yet, as pitches go, it’s hardly novel. Similar notes have been struck so often by 
post-war UK governments that what is really arresting is the fact that it still seems 
vital to strike them. It’s rather a giveaway. Whatever social mobility is, we clearly 
haven’t been achieving it.  
 
John Major, Tony Blair, David Cameron - all, as prime ministers, sought to define 
themselves as breakers of sedimented unearned privilege. Cameron went as far as 
setting up the Social Mobility and Child Poverty Commission, chaired since its 2012 
inception by former Labour Health Secretary Alan Milburn. (Recently, with the 
reframing and downgrading of child poverty as a priority, it was renamed simply as 
the Social Mobility Commission.) Yet perhaps Gordon Brown went furthest in his 
fervency, in words at least. In 2010, he wrote that ‘social mobility is not an alternative 
to social justice - it is modern social justice’.ii So that’s it. The single requirement for 
a just society is that people end up in different circumstances from those in which 
they’re born. Social mobility, all by itself, will deliver it. Nothing further is necessary, 
by way of radical shifts in the economic and social structures of society - or rather, if 
social mobility is achieved, it will be as a result of those structures already being 
arranged aright. This claim has a beautiful simplicity about it. But that might be part 
of the problem. To see social mobility as the only indicator we need poses grave 
hurdles for the tackling of social injustice.
iii
  
 
… perhaps all the more because we’ve been losing it 
That’s not, for a moment, to deny that there is a problem. It is not that social 
immobility, or inter-generational inequality - or what John Goldthorpe, doyen of 
social mobility analysis, has called ‘class fate’ - isn’t itself an urgent thing to tackle. 
In contemporary Britain, in dismally familiar ways, background seems to matter as 
much as ever. In terms of state school achievements, the initially highest attaining 
among the most disadvantaged children are, on average, overtaken by the moderately 
attaining most advantaged children somewhere between the ages of five and sixteen.
iv
 
In other words, though they start out achieving higher grades, the ‘smart’ poor kids 
are overtaken by the ‘average’ rich kids by the time they do their GCSEs. They are 
then eight times less likely to attend an elite university than their privileged peers. On 
average they will also earn less, feel less healthy, and die younger. Meanwhile 71 per 
cent of senior judges, 43 per cent of newspaper columnists, 33 per cent of MPs and 22 
per cent of pop stars were privately educated (compared to 7 per cent of the 
population as a whole).
v  
 
These numbers are hardly receding; in some areas (as in the case of pop stars) they are 
creeping steadily up. The post-war ‘golden age’ of social mobility is over - and in any 
case the golden age had nothing to do with the effects of grammar schools: it was 
economic shifts (in particular the growth of professional jobs) that propelled upward 
mobility during the long post-war economic boom that ended in the 1970s.
vi
 Since 
then, under any plausible narrative, social mobility has slowed. The correlation 
between parental and child income, for example, is stronger for those born in 1970 
than those born in 1958 - the poorest of whom were considerably more likely than the 
generation that followed to be earning more than their parents by the time they were 
forty. 
 
These points may shock, but they are hardly a surprise. They correspond to our 
everyday experiences of the architecture of twenty-first century society - and are not 
so dissimilar to those of the nineteenth century. The contours of class fate have shifted 
since then, and the gaps are often smaller. Compulsory education and the welfare state 
have made hefty, and precious, impacts. But contemporary Britain remains defined by 
inequality of life chances - even as it seems that everyone whose job it is to pronounce 
on these things talks as if there could barely be a higher priority than equalising them. 
There is a basic kind of unfairness at stake - invoked unfailingly but ineffectively each 
time a cabinet member runs social mobility rhetoric up the flagpole. The children of 
the advantaged and the disadvantaged can hardly be said, in some general way, to 
have earned their different destinations. Given that life chances are shaped by patterns 
of educational achievement that reflect the class background of parents rather than the 
‘talents’ of their children, it is the most basic sociological mistake to see 
intergenerational inequality as a reflection of merit. Even ardent monarchists will 
grant that (for non-royals, anyway) class fate is as unfair as it is stubborn. 
 
So why isn’t promoting social mobility, just by itself, the answer? A clue lies in the 
fact that it seems so costless a goal to promote - it is a vanilla solution, to which 
nobody reasonable would object. But it is just this feature of social mobility talk 
which should set us to work. We need to look at what social mobility talk is a 
substitute for - what other considerations it obscures or distracts us from. One of these 
is a proper discussion of economic inequality. Another (though it is related) is a 
confrontation with the social impacts of the family. So we find a stark reluctance in 
the contemporary political mainstream to acknowledge - on the first point - that 
inequality of outcome is a problem in itself, and - on the second point - that tackling 
intergenerational inequality means doing something about family privilege. And that 
kind of talk, now as much as ever, is taken to be political kryptonite. 
 
The rest of this article aims to give a sense of just how urgent it is to reverse current 
orthodoxies about equality and the family. Urgent, that is, if we are to be spared the 
spectacle of a string of May’s successors across the decades to come, seeking a 
headline as they make themselves comfortable in office by making lofty declamations 
that it’s high time we did something about social mobility. First, it is worth spending 
some time looking a little longer at the nature of the orthodoxies themselves. If we 
don’t talk well about class fate, it’s helpful to consider why. 
 
Families, life chances and ‘common sense’  
A helpful line of approach is offered by Stuart Hall and Alan O’Shea’s version of 
‘common sense’: ‘popular, easily-available knowledge … customary beliefs, wise 
sayings, popular nostrums and prejudices’.vii Viewed this way, common sense is the 
apparatus of ‘everyday thinking’ we rest on when we feel safe to say ‘of course!’. So 
one reason that it is politically difficult to confront class fate in a lucid or coherent 
way is the resilience of common sense attitudes, and in particular the uneasy 
relationship between three specific items of common sense that underpin ideas about 
social mobility. 
 
The first of these is the value of mobility as a virtue, which is - of course - taken as a 
given. As we have seen, social mobility has a kind of mystical power that can unify 
the Daily Mail and the Guardian through the shared assumption that it is something 
we need more of. Its thwarting is thus a defeat for a ‘common sense’ vision of 
fairness, in which it is merit rather than unearned privilege that accounts for our social 
station. But the notion of talent or merit is, of course, itself part of a common sense 
understanding of how society functions; and it is a shifting construction - a prime 
example of an attribute that is, in vital respects, relative to the society in which one 
lives and works. Are high-earning City analysts super-talented? Are their skills, the 
hours they work or the contributions they make worthy of wages so far distant from 
those of a teaching assistant? And what does ‘doing well’ mean? Whether it is 
measured in terms of wages or exam results or status or health, there is always plenty 
of room for questioning the potential noxiousness of any ideology of ‘success’, 
‘getting ahead’, or ‘bettering oneself’.  
 
Meanwhile the vision of a society efficiently rewarding merit is not an entirely 
coherent and appealing one, as critics from Michael Young to, recently, Jo Littler and 
James Bloodworth have sought to tease out.
viii
 A world where people are apparently 
judged on their ‘talent’, and how hard they have worked, is a world where the less 
‘talented’, or the less able to work, are seen as deserving of their low status, and the 
stigma it brings. And in fact many of those professedly keenest to promote 
meritocracy - the famously ‘sharp-elbowed’ among the middle classes, for example - 
are also those most likely to seek to disrupt it through pulling whatever social levers 
are available to them in the promotion of their own child’s life chances, regardless of 
their ‘talents’. Still, for all this, an appeal to the value of social mobility has the feel of 
a risk-free button. This presumably accounts for the enthusiasm it inspires in so many 
- like Theresa May - when seeking a reliable ‘one nation’ motif.  
 
The second common sense idea in the mix under consideration here is the value of the 
family: in political terms it is prohibitively hard to tamper with received ideas on the 
family. We can hardly move for references to ‘hard-working families’; and there is a 
constant linking of family ties and the domestic sphere to what is primary, secure and 
enduring in a world of flux. ‘What could be more natural’, asked David Cameron in 
2015, ‘than the urge to pass down to one’s children what one has worked hard to 
achieve?’. This point is designed for cross-class appeal. It carries no suggestion that 
family matters more to the posh than the poor, or vice versa, or that the ‘urge’ is 
contingent on holding particular beliefs. The ‘naturalness’ of the family coming first 
is presented as a kind of social unifier, cutting across other kinds of more divisive 
allegiance. It’s ‘the family’ which matters, not this or that family, in these or those 
circumstances. Individual families are invoked as exemplars of this wider social 
institution. They are, this suggests, equal stakeholders in it. We all win when families 
win, or are strong, or are supported in ‘doing their job’.  
 
It is worth noting the specific policy proposal that Cameron was setting out in making 
this pitch. It was a raising of the threshold for inheritance tax. So a momentous and 
regressive tweak of fiscal policy - one which will benefit only those already best-
placed to advantage their own children over others - is defended on the deflationary, 
matter-of-fact basis that the desire to privilege one’s own is only natural. So those 
singing loudly of social mobility are also the keenest to promote family privilege. Of 
course, the Daily Mail is full of both these ideas - forever busily trying to mount two 
horses that are departing in different directions. But though the Mail is especially 
noisy as it does so, it is hardly alone in the attempt. 
 
Thirdly, we hold conflicted views on the appropriate scope and purchase of the idea 
of equality. It is safe to say that the idea that every child matters equally, or deserves 
an equally ‘fair go’ in life, is genuinely held by most. Of course they do. To say 
otherwise is generally regarded as speaking in the terms of a pre-modern endorsement 
of a hierarchy of birth, or as treading too closely to racism, or other kinds of outright 
chauvinism which, even if felt, it is not OK to voice. Support for equality of life 
chances has various potential ingredients including intuitions about meritocracy; 
assumptions of childhood innocence; the view that people should be judged according 
to their deeds and not where they’re from, or their accent, or the jobs their parents do. 
It chimes as resonantly with the American dream as it does with Marx’s depictions of 
the achievement of communism. Yet at the same time, most of us - of course - behave 
in ways intended to undermine it.  
 
For one thing, many of the most routine decisions that parents make, in the humdrum 
flow of family life, make a mess of that notion that kids might have an equal start - 
with this often being precisely their point (though in an unequal society, where 
educational achievement is a positional good, it is in fact impossible to promote one’s 
own children’s educational attainment without securing for them an advantage over 
another child). Each of the following practices promotes the life chances of some kids 
over others, in unearned ways. Paying for their education. Moving house to the 
catchment area of a better state school. Bequeathing money. Arranging internships via 
personal contacts. Helping with homework. Having shared mealtimes. Discussing 
current affairs at shared mealtimes. Using words in the home in ways that have the 
effect of expanding children’s vocabulary. Paying for dance lessons. Reading bedtime 
stories. All of these stand to accelerate unearned privilege - bedtime stories no less 
than the things that require far greater outlay or cultural capital. Some will think all of 
these are equally permissible; others will quibble over one or other. But everyone, 
including the hardest-core egalitarian, thinks that at least some of these things are OK. 
What’s ‘common sense’ about all this is not the experience of the gap between a 
Comment [SD1]: I 
put this in as the 
implication otherwise 
is that it is wrong to 
try to develop your 
child’s growth etc in 
any way 
Comment [GJ2]: Q
uite happy with this – 
thanks.   
genuine belief in equality of life chances and routine practices of parenting which 
promote some kids’ life chances over others, but the sense that - of course - we’re 
entitled to do those things. 
  
More than that: we may see it as our job, as parents, as family members, as relatives, 
to prioritise our own. To many it would seem downright remiss not to have tried to 
boost the social mobility of our children, or (if they have started out privileged) to 
have preserved their place on the ladder, to bequeath to them as much as we legally 
can. In a world of ‘tiger mums’ and sharp-elbowed dads there is an inflation in the 
expectations of what ‘good’ parents should be doing for their kids - of what is ‘only 
natural’. This is cashed out largely in terms of economic advantage. As Megan 
Erickson puts it, ‘The nurturing and raising of children, once seen as deserving of 
fierce protection from market forces, has now become intertwined with economic 
pressures: It is never too early to start equipping a child with the skills and personality 
traits that will ensure productivity and success in the global economy’.ix It’s what any 
right-thinking citizen would seek to do with their ‘natural urges’.  
 
But this is where our three items of ‘common sense’ come apart. Even if each stands 
up by itself, these parallel endorsements of social mobility, the family and equality of 
life chances can’t be made to stick coherently together. A world where parents are 
entitled to do whatever they can for their kids means the kids of the privileged stay 
privileged and the kids of the disadvantaged stay disadvantaged. It means a world 
where children do not have equal life chances. The stakes are rigged. The playing 
field is quite definitively unlevel. Common sense doesn’t square with itself. If it’s 
really true that we want social mobility, it seems, then its price must be an 
unsanctifying of the family, or a limiting of parents’ entitlements to ‘do the best for 
their kids’. 
 
Either redistribute … 
Our three points of ‘common sense’ say nothing about the redistribution of wealth. 
It’s not just that I happen to have left that out. It is because the need for strong 
redistribution is not – of course – current political common sense. Social mobility talk 
drowns it out. Typically, ‘equal life chances’ are invoked without any kind of nod to 
equality of outcome: to narrowing the gap between those with more and those with 
less. In fact, the kind of equality at stake in discussions of social mobility is one which 
would be entirely compatible with that gap growing larger - as indeed it has in the UK 
since the late 1970s and the neoliberal turn. 
 
Take these two statements by Nick Clegg, who as Deputy Prime Minister in the 2010-
15 Coalition put regular stress on just how unfair inequality of life chances is, and 
how urgent a priority tackling it should be: 
 
In Britain today, life chances are narrowed for too many by the circumstances 
of their birth: the home they’re born into, the neighbourhood they grow up in 
or the jobs their parents do.
x 
 
 
Social mobility is what characterises a fair society, rather than a particular 
level of income equality. Inequalities become injustices when they are fixed; 
passed on, generation to generation.
xi
 
 
The first statement offers a tableau of unfair advantage - confirmed by the final 
sentence of the second. But for Clegg inequality within a generation has always yet to 
become an injustice: inequality only becomes unjust when it is visited, unearned, on 
following generations. So the key to a fair solution is the first sentence of point two. 
We’re back with a Brown-style invocation of social mobility as definitive of social 
justice - and with, quite explicitly, a denial that income inequality has anything to do 
with all this. 
 
Isolating these points isn’t to pick on Clegg, or make a special example of him. His is 
not a special stance at all. It’s more or less the opposite of an outlier. These quotes 
make a neat summary of a position to which, in the years of neoliberal orthodoxy, the 
UK’s political mainstream has cheerfully and persistently signed up. This is an idea of 
fairness made safe for common sense. But it simply ignores the fact that in societies 
with drastic income inequality, the starting-points of the lives of children, who will 
inevitably be born into different levels of wealth advantage, will simply be unlevel. 
No amount of ‘equal opportunities’ talk will somehow undo this staggered start. The 
kids of the best-off start out with conditions of advantage which ultimately issue in 
those better GCSE results. There is every sociological reason to recognise that one 
generation’s class position is already in the process of being transmitted to the next - 
even as political orthodoxy insists that strong economic redistribution is off-limits.  
For one thing, redistribution would involve asking the anxious, vocal, voting middle 
classes to accept the prospect of their kids dropping down the social ladder. It would 
mean facing up to the fact that, in resettling the patterns of advantage and 
disadvantage, we would need substantial downward mobility for some, as well as 
plenty of others moving up. It would mean taking seriously precisely the need to 
narrow the gap between ‘up’ and ‘down’. 
 
… or disrupt family privilege 
There is a further nettle to grasp here. Redistribution would involve concertedly 
neutralising, or at least scaling down, the maldistributive effects of family influence 
on the life chances of children. One option would be to ramp up inheritance tax, or 
replace it with an accessions tax, so that inherited income is taxed progressively like 
other income. Another would be to intervene in the property market, to block another 
of the main channels through which family wealth is transmitted unearned from one 
generation to the next. We could also shore up and reform Sure Start, a prime casualty 
of the post-2010 austerity agenda. Although its founding aims were crassly 
instrumental in some respects, its targeting of parents in areas of deprivation was a 
roughly joined-up response to the differing levels of parental power to advantage their 
kids in their early years. We could also identify childcare as a key good to be 
redistributed according to a metric of social justice, so that its benefits (and costs) are 
shared more equitably - perhaps via the kind of universal childcare model proposed 
by Labour in the 2015 election. We could also take seriously the ways in which the 
education system - and the rhetoric of ‘choice’ and ‘merit’ so pivotal to the familiar 
case for the return of grammar schools - serves to favour those better-off families 
already best positioned to exploit the unevenness of current provision. We could also - 
of course - abolish private schools, though admittedly, that idea might need a longer 
run-up. 
 
These are all moves that would promote social mobility by recognising the crucial 
role played by families in the maintenance of class fate and seeking to counteract it. 
Such moves are also based on the recognition that the scale of class divisions is not a 
given, but can itself be reduced; that class fate is a side-effect not of lack of choice, 
but of long-established structural unfairness. Will any of this form part of the May 
agenda? Of course it won’t. It’s highly unlikely even to be gestured at. But that just 
goes to show how hollow and unrealistic social mobility talk has become.  
 
Gideon Calder teaches at Swansea University, and is the author of How Inequality 
Runs in Families: Unfair Advantage and the Limits of Social Mobility, published in 
October 2016 by Policy Press. 
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